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GROWTH AND FEDERAL INCOME TAXES
RICHARD V. CARPBNTER -
Remota justitia, quid sunt regna nisi magna latrocinia.'
PROPER tax policy should seek a more or less mobile
balance between the competing interests of such con-
trasting groups as earners and investors, consumers and
producers, rich and poor, and citizens and government.
We say mobile because such balance will shift-if ever so
slightly-with every development in the social economy.
Ideally the balance should be determined by economic and
ethical factors directed toward the general welfare. In
actuality, of course, it will be fixed in large part by the
relative political powers of the sectors of society which are
affected. We can identify at least three principal approaches
in this country to the question of tax policy, each character-
ized by the preference it would bestow on one sector of
society over another. To enumerate them briefly, one
approach favors lower-income families whose incomes may
be expected to be spent in large part on consumer goods, 2
another tends to favor entrepreneurs and the business and
investment classes,3 while a third is disinclined to favor
any class of taxpayers but, instead, advocates increasing
the proportion of gross national income appropriated for
the socialized activities of the state.4
The supporters of the three respective approaches all
presumably would agree on the desirability of one goal-
t Member of the New York Bar and Professor of Law, Loyola Uni-
versity School of Law, Chicago.
1Attributed to St. Augustine. Freely translated: "Absent justice,
government is nothing more than large scale racketeering."
2 AMERIcANs FOR DEMOCRATIc AcTIoN, GUIDE TO POLITICS, 1954, at 14
(Howe & Schlesinger ed.).
3 COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT, GROWTH AND TAXES, SIEPS
FOR 1961.
4 GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1958).
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industrial growth. They disagree on means. The rate
of economic growth became a prime political issue in the
last presidential campaign. Over a long period of time
the growth of the American economy is said to have
averaged 3 per cent per year and certainly this growth
has heretofore yielded unprecedented prosperity for our
country. During the past few years, however, this rate
is said to have slowed to about 2.5 per cent per year or
less and authorities generally agree that this is inadequate
for the general welfare. Walter W. Heller, reputed to be
the favorite economist for the present administration,
advances the premises that our labor force rises by 1.5
per cent per year and normally the average output per man
increases 2 per cent per year. From these premises he
concludes that we must improve our annual growth rate to
at least 3.5 per cent just to hold our own-let alone to
achieve desired new goals.5 As a matter of fact he may
be overly conservative in his figures inasmuch as population
experts plausibly predict that our labor force will increase
much more rapidly during the 1960's than heretofore.
The children representing the so-called "population ex-
plosion" of wartime and early post-war years will for the
first time be seeking jobs. Since the war our over-all
population has been increasing more rapidly than our labor
force, but now we may expect the labor force to increase
at a faster rate than our population.
In any event, it is interesting to compare Heller's
figures with the economic growth rates which he cites for
other industrial nations: Germany, Japan and Italy whose
rates are said to exceed 5 per cent; Holland and Switzerland
exceeding 4 per cent; and Sweden exceeding 3 per cent.
We may have some mental reservations about the precise
accuracy of these estimated figures, but they still furnish
some basis for tentative comparison. Practically all other
industrial countries of the free world (except the United
Kingdom) outstrip us in the rate of industrial expansion.
In appraising these comparative figures some persons take
Life, March 10, 1961, p. 24.
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solace in the fact that our growth rate is expressed in
percentages of a gross national production which is already
the highest in the world, whereas other countries start
from substantially lower levels. It is disturbing, however,
to see their growth rates continuing at high rates even
as their industries expand,' whereas ours appears to be
slowing down. Obviously the increasing prosperity and
brightening prospects of the nations of the European Com-
munity and of Japan are the most hopeful portents on
the horizon of foreign affairs. The United States may
take some credit for having initiated this prosperity in
the first instance by adopting the Marshall Plan during
the Truman administration. But the pace of advance of
these nations also highlights by contrast the deceleration
of our own progress. This is what should cause us concern.
It challenges us to improve our own rate of industrial
growth in order to maintain our high standard of living
and, more important, to avoid increasing unemployment.
The question is how can taxes be apportioned and
imposed so as to stimulate industrial growth or, perhaps
more accurately, to hold the economy back the least.
Suppose we imagine our industrial economy as a troika
drawn by three horses representing, respectively, the small-
income and working class (consumers), business and the big-
income class (investors), and last but not least, the
government. Proponents of the first tax approach described
in our opening paragraph contend that if we feed and
pamper the first horse, all will be well. They point to
the overcapacity existing in certain industries and conclude
that the weak spot in our economy lies in underconsumption.
If we divert more disposable income into the hands of
consumers by increasing wages and/or decreasing their
taxes, they will spend it on consumer goods and the rest
of the economy will take care of itself. The second horse
will pull harder to keep up with the first (supply rising
to meet demand), and the efforts of the first two will ease
6This is true despite cyclical variations. During 1962 there appears
to have been some hesitation in the growth rate of some countries in the
European community.
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the load and give a "second wind" to the third horse
(increased production will broaden the tax base and produce
more tax income). In this happy view the troika will soon
be galloping out of the woods and leaving the wolves far
behind.
Proponents of the second tax approach, on the other
hand, believe it is the second horse whose undernourishment
and stumbling gait threatens the progress of the troika.
They point to the fact that for many years the first and
third horses have been getting an ever-increasing share of
the available oats (accompanied by spiraling prices and,
more recently, by shrinking profit margins).' In our
current economy, consumer spending is the one factor
which has most consistently remained at all-time highs
and has continued upward. It therefore hardly seems
reasonable to blame underconsumption for our lagging
growth and high unemployment. On the contrary our
weakness seems to lie in lagging capital investment for the
improvement and expansion of our industrial plant, ex-
plained by the cloudy outlook for profits.
Proponents for the third tax approach, of course, back
the third horse of the troika. Professor John K. Galbraith
has published a best-selling defense of their position,.
curiously based on moralistic condemnation of the vulgarities
of money-spending status seekers in an affluent society.'
Professor Galbraith is a clever and witty pamphleteer who
believes that material wealth in our society has already so
far outstripped our rational wants that we should no longer
seek to expand productivity for the private sector of society.
He speaks of "the thralldom of a myth"--the myth "that
production by its overpowering importance and its in-
eluctable difficulty, is the central problem of our lives."
He would avoid the complexity of inducing growth by
encouraging unpredictable individuals to spend money for
consumer goods or for modernizing and expanding productive
facilities. In lieu thereof he would leave to the wise and
7First National City Bank, Monthly Economic Letter, April 1962, pp.
39-42.
8 GALBRAITH, op. cit. supra note 4.
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good philosophers who run our government the choice of
spending money for public buildings and monuments, edu-
cation and art, public parks and highways and other non-
productive purposes-possibly for prestige excursions to the
moon. The program calls to mind the tongue-in-cheek (we
hope) fable recounted somewhere by Lord Keynes. Once
upon a time a depression-ridden nation went to war and
found that war revitalized its economy with prices high
and all men employed and happy. Then came peace and
the cabinet members of the government gloomily met to
face the prospect of renewed depression. The cabinet,
however, hit on a brilliant solution by deciding to continue
its mammoth purchases of munitions which the people could
fire happily and harmlessly into space in a continuous
Fourth of July celebration. Upon this public disposal of
excess production the national economy continued in high
gear and everybody lived happily ever after.
The problem, however, is not simply one of dividing
the national wealth among the sectors of society to see that
money gets into circulation quickly. It is a question also
of encouraging stronger incentives to create more wealth-
namely, to stimulate economic growth. Certainly the nation
must spend a good portion of its income on consumer goods.
This is essential for its well-being and enjoyment of life.
But our economy, including our industrial capacity, is also
geared to production of capital goods for new development
and expansion-the bone and brawn of economic growth.
When demand falters for capital goods we naturally must
expect some excess capacity to show up in our industrial
plant. Under such circumstances it smacks of folly to
seek to cure the imbalance by government policies which
further jeopardize the producers' prospect of profits. Yet
such jeopardy seems implicit in policies purporting to
stimulate consumer buying by means of massive government
expenditures for nonproductive purposes or of encouraging
wage increases which are not economically justified. In the
one case producers' profits are threatened by high taxes, in
the other by high costs. It is fallacious (and possibly
intellectually dishonest) to seek to justify wage increases
on the ground of labor's increased productivity when the
[ VOL. 37
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latter results solely from industry's increased investment in
more efficient machinery. In such case any wage hike
should rightly be subject to industry's prior claim for a
profit increase proportionate to its increased investment.
Consumption contributes to economic growth only in-
directly by stimulating the improvement and expansion of
industry to produce more and better goods to meet the
demand. Even demand, however, will fail to stimulate
production and supply when the government artificially
creates that demand under conditions which do not afford
adequate profit incentives for productive investment. Busi-
ness may sometimes lose confidence that simple price in-
creases are feasible to offset higher taxes and costs. They
may fear price increases will invite retaliatory legislation
or administrative action or they may worry about pricing
themselves above the reach of those customers who live on
relatively fixed incomes. Certainly today they have good
reason to foresee strengthening competition from foreign
industries operating in political climates more favorable to
private enterprise and profit. Yet we know the expectation
of profits is a sine qua non for industrial growth in a free
economy. The United States Department of Commerce has
come to recognize the range and margin of corporate profits
as leading indicators forecasting expansion and contraction
in business cycles.' The National Bureau of Economic
Research soberly states: "Active and prospective profits
play a vital role in the generation of business cycles. By
providing the incentives as well as the wherewithal for
investment, by generating optimism or pessimism about
the business outlook, by stimulating expansion or forcing
retrenchment, profits (or losses) occupy a strategic position
in a private enterprise economy." 10
Nonproductive public disbursements paid by deficit
financing or by money siphoned off in the form of high
taxes may, in the long run, be overshadowed by the volume
9 Business Cycle Developments, Sept. 1962, at 18-29 (Series 16, 18 & 22
in Chart 1 and Tables 1 & 2).
10 1 NATiONAL BuREAU OF ECONOmiC RESEARCH, BUSINESS CYCLE IN-
DICATORS 67 (1961).
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of private investment which it effectively deters. In any
event such nonproductive public disbursements will stimulate
the economy only as long as they continue to be made.
Once they are cut off the economy will be worse than ever.
In combatting recession the difference between govern-
ment spending for pyramids and sphinxes, on the one hand,
and profit-motivated expenditures for industrial expansion,
on the other, can be compared to the difference between
paying $1,000 to an indigent man over six-months time
to chip rocks for your garden wall by sledge and chisel,
and by paying him the same amount to buy automatic
stone-cutting and polishing tools. In the first instance
you will still have an indigent man on your hands at the
end of the six months. In the second case the man should
no longer be indigent-he will have tools which he can
use with profit. Of course, in the first case, you would
end up with a wall in your garden just as Egypt has its
sphinx and pyramids, but walls and pyramids are inert
objects which contribute little to the dynamics of an economic
system. It is not the corn we eat nor even the corn we
pile up in overflowing granaries which makes for economic
growth; the only corn which grows is the corn we plant
in the ground. If we can improve the strain by hy-
bridization, so much the better. Similarly, the seed of our
economy is the money we plough into the creation, expansion
and improvement of facilities to produce more and better
goods.
This long introduction brings us abruptly to the avowed
subject of this paper-the effect of tax policies on our
economic growth. Many factors undoubtedly have con-
tributed to the sluggishness of our growth-practically all
of them operating through their depressant effect on the
prospect of profits. In this paper we propose to direct our
remarks principally to the peculiarities of our tax structure
-that being the factor for which our government has the
most direct responsibility. On two counts our federal tax
laws may be blamed for discouraging and slowing business
growth-the excessive double bite which income taxes take
from corporate income and again from such income when
distributed to shareholders in the form of dividends, and
[ VOL. 37
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second, the prolonged time required under our tax policies
for a taxpayer to recoup a capital investment tax-free
through the allowance of depreciation deductions against
taxable income. On July 11, 1962 the Treasury issued
regulations substantially liberalizing its long standing de-
preciation policies" but even with these much needed
changes our depreciation allowances still remain the least
liberal in the free world.
TAx RATES AND DOUBLE TAXATION
The federal income tax rate on each $100 of an in-
dustrial corporation is generally $52. If the corporation
then distributed to a stockholder as a dividend the $48
which it retained after taxes, the stockholder in turn would
be taxed thereon in accordance with his top tax bracket.
Thus an individual with an income of $16,000 who received
such a $48 dividend would be compelled to pay 50 per cent
thereof to the government in the form of personal income
tax. Under these circumstances the United States govern-
ment would be collecting 76 per cent of all industrial profits
while the stockholders, who theoretically are the ultimate
owners of the industrial enterprise under our system of
"private enterprise", would be entitled to only 24 per cent.
Moreover, this result would be reached without considering
the impact of federal excise taxes and of state and local
taxes.
In the 1954 Code, Congress did permit some minimal
relief from this burden of double taxation-namely, taxation
on profits in the hands of the corporation and then again
on the same profits in the hands of stockholders to whom
they are distributed in the form of dividends. Section 116
was drafted to permit the individual stockholder to exclude
from his gross income the first $50 in dividends which
he received in any tax year. This exclusion may be popular
with a relatively large number of voters who happen to
own only a few shares of stock, but it has insignificant
11 Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962 INT. REv. BULL. No. 30, at 5.
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effect on larger investors whose investment decisions bear
strongly on the industrial growth rate of the country. In
addition, Congress allows shareholders a credit against their
personal income tax measured by 4 per cent of dividends
included in their gross income. Thus a shareholder receiving
$100 in dividends (over and above the $50 exclusion)
would have a credit of $4 which he could apply against his
tax bill whether his top bracket was 20 per cent or 91 per
cent. Minimal as has been the relief afforded by this 4 per
cent dividend tax credit, the present treasury officials have
actually advocated its repeal.
In contrast with this harsh insistence by our officials
on double taxation of dividends, other governments have
gone a long way to reduce such double taxation and some
have completely eliminated it. Both Belgium and Italy
completely exempt shareholders from the standard income
tax on dividends to the extent the corporation has paid
such tax on the same income. The United Kingdom relieves
a corporation of the standard income tax on the portion
of profits which it distributes to shareholders-although the
corporation is required to withhold such tax and pay it
on account of the respective shareholders. Germany taxes
distributed corporate profits at the maximum rate of 15
per cent as opposed to the maximum 51 per cent rate
imposed on undistributed profits. Canada grants to share-
holders a 20 per cent tax credit on the amount of dividends
received from a Canadian corporation. These provisions
are described in greater detail in Schedule A appended
to this article.
POLICIES GOVERNING DEPRECIATION DEDUCTIONS
To determine actual net income, according to elementary
principles of accounting, one must deduct from gross income,
among other things, a reasonable amount representing the
wear, tear and obsolescence of physical property which has
been used in the production of the income. Traditionally
the Treasury has permitted taxpayers to recover tax-free
the historical costs of such physical assets by allowing them
depreciation deductions spread over the estimated useful
[ VOL.. 37
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life of the assets. Up until July 11, 1962 the only official
formal guide in this country for estimating the lives of
various classes of property was Bulletin F which had been
last revised in 1942. On July 11, 1962 the Internal
Revenue Service at long last replaced Bulletin F with
Revenue Procedure 62-21 12 which gives us greatly simplified
and liberalized guide lines for depreciation. It is a sub-
stantial improvement over the bulletin which it replaced
but it is questionable whether it has gone far enough.
Bulletin F complicated tax accounting unduly by requiring
the detailed calculation of depreciation on a vast number
of explicit categories of depreciable property. The new
regulation reduces these categories to about seventy-five
broad classes of assets. For most taxpayers it is expected
that three or four guidelines will cover all their depreciable
assets. This is all to the good.
An even worse feature of Bulletin F has been that it
attributed overlong lives to the various categories of de-
preciable assets. True, it purported to allow taxpayers
to calculate their depreciation deductions in accordance
with their individual replacement practices, and apparently
many big taxpayers, better represented by tax accountants
and attorneys, have managed to benefit by this provision.
Some of these taxpayers, in fact, now complain that the new
procedure offers them no advantage. By and large, however,
government tax men have been loath to depart from the
letter of Bulletin F and- very likely most taxpayers have
been writing off their depreciable assets no faster than
indicated by BulletinL F. The guidelines under the new
regulation should relieve this situation, at least temporarily,
by establishing shorter norms for estimating the useful
life of depreciable assets. To give a single example: Bulletin
F gave composite lives ranging from fifteen to twenty-five
years on machinery and equipment in the metal products
industries, which would result in straight-line depreciation
rates of 6-2/3 per cent to 4 per cent per annum. In contrast
the new guidelines accord an estimated twelve-year life to
12 Ibid.
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production machinery and equipment for fabricated metal
products, thus indicating a proper depreciation rate of 8
per cent on a straight-line basis. Nevertheless the new
regulation may conceal a joker. A taxpayer may use the
new guidelines as a matter of right and without question
by the Revenue Service for only an initial period of
three years. At the end of the trial period the taxpayer
must justify his depreciation rate by proof that such rate
is in accord with his replacement practice. He can meet
the burden of such proof by means of a complicated formula
based on reserve ratios-viz., ratios of the depreciation
reserve for assets in various guideline classes to the original
cost or other tax basis of such assets. The purpose and
normal effect of liberalized depreciation is to stimulate in-
dustrial investment and replacement. The government
insists in taking back the liberalized benefits from a tax-
payer in each instance unless the taxpayer can show he has
kept up a satisfactory rate of replacement. Our government
leaves nothing to chance. It continues to ride taxpayers
with a short rein and a curb bit.
The real issue in this problem turns on whether de-
preciation deductions should be tied so closely to the
actual useful life of the depreciable assets, and if so tied,
then whether deductions should be spread evenly over the
life of the asset on a straight-line basis or, in the alternative,
should be accelerated. by allowing early deductions in pro-
portionately greater amounts. After all, it is common
experience that a newly purchased asset (e.g., a motor car)
is subject to a greater loss in market value in the first
year of ownership than in later years. Congress gave
its own answer to the latter part of this question when
it enacted Section 167(b) of the 1954 Code which permits
some acceleration of deductions for depreciation in the
early years of the estimated life of a physical asset. Thus
the declining-balance method permits the use of a deprecia-
tion rate not exceeding twice the depreciation rate which
would be allowable under the straight-line method. For
example, in the case of an asset costing $100 with a life
of 12 years imputed to it under the new guidelines, the
annual depreciation rate under the straight-line method
[ VOL. 37
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would be 832 per cent or 8.50 each year for 12 years.
Under the declining-balance method the taxpayer would
be allowed to double the depreciation rate to 17 per cent
but such doubled rate could be taken each year only on the
declining balance of the asset's historical cost (or other
tax basis) after deduction of previous depreciation charges.
Thus in the first year the taxpayer could deduct 17 per cent
of ,100 or $17, in the second year 17 per cent of $83 or
$14.10, in the third year 17 per cent of 568.90 or 811.70 and
so on. In the first three years a taxpayer could thus charge
off an aggregate of 42.8 per cent of the machine's cost.
If we compared even these liberalized depreciation
practices with those of foreign countries, we would see that
in the first three years France would probably permit a
taxpayer to charge off 75.57 per cent on most machines,
West Germany 57.8 per cent and substantially more if the
machine were a so-called "basic industry," and Sweden
about 71 per cent. Due to many variances in the deprecia-
tion practices of different countries it is dangerous to try
to oversimplify comparisons; Schedule B appended hereto
describes in some detail the depreciation policies of leading
foreign industrial countries. By and large, foreign govern-
ments are far more liberal to taxpayers in this area than
is our own government. Sweden's experimentation with
depreciation policies is particulary interesting because of its
reputation as a "socialist state" committed to a planned
economy. From 1938 to 1955 Sweden permitted taxpayers
to write off and deduct their capital costs whenever they
saw fit - even to the extreme of allowing deduction of
100 per cent of the cost in the year of acquisition of assets.
This "free depreciation" policy was recommended by a
1936 tax committee when Sweden, concerned with the de-
pression of the 1930's, sought devices to limit or forestall
future depressions. It was believed that high depreciation
deductions in good years and low depreciation charges in
bad years would tend to stabilize industrial earnings. In
post-war years the policy was found to contribute to in-
flation because it overstimulated capital investment. In
1962 ]
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1955 Sweden therefore modified its policy to that described
in Schedule B.13
Why should Congress limit accelerated depreciation on
the declining-balance method to double the straight-line rate?
Why not triple? And why should taxpayers be required
to justify their depreciation rates even when they are within
the norms of the guidelines set out in the new regulation?
Certainly it would simplify taxpayers' accounting procedures
if they were permitted to compute their depreciation in
accordance with the guidelines without any labored and
involved calculation of reserve ratios. Even if a taxpayer's
depreciation deductions might sometimes exceed the amount
justified by his replacement practices, the net result would
be merely a minor additional acceleration of write-offs.
In no case over the long run would it give a taxpayer
aggregate deductions in excess of what he had actually
paid for his depreciable assets.
In discussing the great size of the government's tax
take from corporate profits, we saw that the government
is the major participant in every enterprise of consequence.
The entrepreneurs put up the capital and take the risk
while the government gets the lion's share of the profits,
if any, without risk. If two men enter into a speculative
enterprise but one of them alone puts up all the required
capital, we see the reason and justice of requiring the
repayment of the capital before distributing the profits.
Applying the same principle to depreciation policies a
good argument could be made in equity to permit a tax-
payer to recover his investment in depreciable assets before
letting the government siphon off the greater part of the
profits in the form of taxes.
Hard-headed economics, moreover, also indicates the
desirability of accelerating depreciation write-offs. Capital
investment is inevitably a calculated risk. A taxpayer
cannot know with certainty whether he will profit from a
capital investment or will lose part or all of the money
13 HARVARD UNIVERSITY, 1959 HARVARD TAX SERIES, TAXATION IN SWEDEN
86 (1959).
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he invests. Existing portents may seem to support his
business judgment as to the near term, but his sense of
risk will normally increase progressively as he is forced
to look further and further into the future for the ultimate
payoff on his investment. Under the circumstances any
acceleration of depreciation deductions seems eminently
suited to enhance the confidence of a prospective investor,
to spur investment and to stimulate industrial growth. After
all, we must bear in mind that such acceleration does not
result in tax avoidance but only in tax deferment. In
the meanwhile it gives taxpayers a greater cash flow out of
which to pay for continued modernization and expansion.
This would go a long way to offset the hardship of the
past twenty years when slow write-offs have been inadequate
to protect against rising costs (namely, for replacing the
property when it is finally discarded) caused by inflation
incident to war and crisis, as well as the slow inflation
which seems deliberately built into some of our government
policies.
A final argument in favor of liberalizing our deprecia-
tion policies is that they should be brought more in line
with the policies of other industrial countries with whom
we are in competition. Otherwise our business works under
a substantial competitive disadvantage.
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT
For two years the current administration has been
pushing the idea of mitigating our harsh depreciation policies
by means of an investment tax credit measured by a fixed
percentage of new industrial investment. The taxpayer
would be allowed to apply this credit against his taxes for
the year in which he makes an industrial investment. It
was not a new idea since England, Belgium and the Nether-
lands have been using various analogous types of investment
allowances or deductions in addition to regular depreciation
deductions. 4 The new tax law of 1962, finally enacted by
14 See Schedule B.
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Congress and signed by the President on October 16, does
now provide for an investment tax credit fixed at seven
per cent of new industrial investment. By its terms a
taxpayer investing $100 in new property will (subject to
defined limitations) receive a credit of $7 which he can
apply against his tax bill, but at the same time the tax
basis of the new property, against which he must compute
his depreciation deductions in subsequent years, must be
correspondingly reduced from $100 to $93. The overall
consequence of this reduction in tax basis will be a reduction
of $7 in the aggregate depreciation deductions spread over
the life of the property and a corresponding increase in
his taxes equal to 527 of $7 or $3.64. The net benefit
to the taxpayer of the much heralded investment tax credit
is therefore not 7% but only 3.36%. In view of the fanfare
with which this tax credit has been introduced it seems
to be another case where the mountain has labored only to
bring forth a mouse. Concern for the treasury deficit is
commendably prudent but it seems ominous that this
prudence should be exercised at the expense of taxpaying
industry by a Congress which has been feeding Leviathan
with the largest appropriations in the history of our country.
MORID COMPARISONS WITH FOREIGN TAX SY S iis
Our tax structure is so designed that it probably drags
on industrial investment and growth more than do the
tax systems of other countries. This is true even though
the over-all taxes of other countries may often absorb
a greater percentage of the gross national product than
do the taxes of our country. Business Week recently pub-
lished the following comparative table showing, with respect
to each country, the percentage of gross national product
taken in 1959 by all taxes of whatever kind-national, state
and local, direct and indirect:"
15 Business Week, Aug. 25, 1962, p. 53, compiled from United Nations
and United States Treasury sources. The British National Institute pub-
lished a similar comparative table for 1959 using somewhat different figures
which do not, however, change the relative position of the United States
as the eleventh most heavily taxed nation in the world. Foreign Tax Weekly
Bull. No. 48, April 26, 1961, p. 5.
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Share of GNP taken
by national, state
Country and local taxes
1. West Germany 34.0%
2. France 33.3%
3. Austria 33.1%
4. Finland 32.1%
5. Norway 31.8%
6. Luxembourg (1958) 30.0%
7. Sweden 29.7%
8. Italy 29.2%
9. Netherlands 29.1%
10. Britain 28.9%
11. United States 26.7%
12. Canada 24.3%
13. Belgium 23.1%
14. Australia 22.0%
15. Japan 19.0%
16. Switzerland 14.4%o
The above figures tend to obscure the tax picture of
the various countries. To begin with, the taxes on which
the comparison is based include payroll and social security
taxes which generally run higher in foreign countries. Yet
when these "taxes" are paid by employers they should
more properly be classed as labor costs since they pay for
employee benefits, and they scarcely begin to close the
wide gap between low labor costs abroad and high American
wages. Moreover, to the extent the employees pay such
social security taxes, the payments are not so much "taxes"
to support the government as premiums to pay for personal
insurance benefits in favor of the payors. The Business
Week article cites figures for the year 1958 11 showing that
29 per cent of the total tax collections at all levels of
government in Germany and France, respectively, consisted
of social security charges. For Italy the corresponding
percentage was 35.5 per cent; for the Netherlands 26 per
16 From data published by the British National Institute.
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cent; for Austria 22 per cent; and for the United Kingdom
13 per cent. In contrast with these figures the cor-
responding percentage in the United States was 14 per cent.
If we adjusted the figures for such countries in the foregoing
comparative table by excluding the effect of the social
security taxes, we see that the share of gross national
production taken by taxes would be reduced approximately
as follows: West Germany-34 per cent reduced to 24
per cent, France-33.3 per cent to 23 per cent, Italy-
29.2 per cent to 19 per cent, Netherlands-29.1 per cent
to 21.5 per cent, Austria-33.1 per cent to 26 per cent,
Britain-28.9 per cent to 25.1 per cent and the United
States-26.7 per cent to 23 per cent. These adjustments
help to put the picture in focus.
We are not entirely sure as to all the factors which
went into the calculation of Gross National Product for
purposes of the above comparative table, and whether it
took into account all expenditures for services and the
like. For that reason it may be significant to consider also
the percentage of national income which is represented by
the total taxes collected by federal, state and all local
governments in the United States. For 1959 this percentage
amounted to 24.9 per cent of national income and for 1960
27.1 per cent. In addition to taxes, moreover, the govern-
ments in the United States also annually receive huge
additional revenues from such sources as current charges,
postal service, highways, natural resources, hospitals, hous-
ing, transportation, interest and insurance trusts. The per-
centage of national income represented by all government
revenues of all governments in the United States (excluding
duplicative transactions) amounted to 33.5 per cent in
1959 and 37 per cent in 1960.1" Unfortunately we do not
have comparable figures for foreign countries. "National
Income" for the purpose of the above computation is de-
fined as "the aggregate earnings of labor and property
17 Computed from data taken from U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, SUMMARY OF GOVERNMENTAL FINANCES IN 1959 (1960) and
U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS,
BUSINESS STATISTICS 1, 197 (1961).
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which arise from the current production of goods and services
by the nation's economy." We also point out the substantial
jump in the percentages represented by the taxes and govern-
ment revenues in the United States for 1960 over the year
1959. This jump would presumably affect the relative
position of the United States in the above comparative table
if it were to be recalculated for the year 1960 and perhaps
for subsequent years.
Probably the most significant difference between the
American tax structure and that of other leading industrial
nations is our disproportionate reliance on income tax
as a source of revenue. According to reported figures,
income taxes produce about a third of total national tax
receipts for leading European countries whereas it produces
about four-fifths of federal tax income in the United States.1 8
Other nations rely more heavily on excise taxes such as
sales and turn-over taxes, license and franchise taxes and
the like. According to figures cited in Business Week, 9
taxes characterized as income and wealth taxes averaged
30 per cent of all tax collections at all levels of government
in representative European countries but constituted 41 per
cent of total tax collections by federal, state and local
governments in the United States. Likewise the European
average percentage represented by indirect taxes such as
sales and excise taxes amounted to 47 per cent compared
to 35 per cent for the United States.
Europeans claim their tax systems give their govern-
ments greater fiscal stability in times of economic slump
whereas our advocates counter that our system acts auto-
matically as an economic stabilizer by restraining booms
through the process of increasing taxes and government
surpluses and by stimulating investment during recessions
through the process of decreasing taxes and resulting govern-
ment deficits. Unfortunately, in practice it has not always
worked out that way. During booms the tax take has
18 Chicago Tribune, July 22, 1962, part 2, p. 1; see also Table of Central
Government Taxes on Income and Capital in First National City Bank,
Monthly Economic Letter, Sept. 1961, p. 100.
19 Business Week, mipra note 15, at 54.
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certainly increased but by operation of Parkinson's Law,
government expenditures have unfailingly risen to meet
income and sometimes even to exceed it. In times of
recession Parkinson's Law does not work in reverse to bring
expenditures down to reduced income, although certainly
the high level of spending engendered by good times has
always served to increase the deficit during recession.
We do not doubt that there are times and circumstances
when government deficits are useful and necessary but
we question the good sense of any man (regardless of
his official or academic standing and regardless of his
eloquence) who would make a virtue of deficits per se at
practically all times and under all circumstances. In
any event the reduction in tax payments due simply to
reduced profits during a recession is scarcely the kind of
tax reduction best designed to spur investment. Moreover,
the stimulant injected into the economy by government
deficits is more often than not derived from inflation of
the money supply (viz., bank deposits) since such deficits
are financed by the sale or pledge of government bonds
to the Federal Reserve Bank system in exchange for created
deposits rather than by the sale to investors who pay there-
fore out of their savings. Over the long run such inflation
may be expected to show up in higher prices for goods
and shrinking value for money. This procedure can become
the cruelest kind of capital levy which a government can
impose on the unsophisticated sector of its citizens.
GDNI RAL DISCUSSION
The deterrent effect of taxation on economic growth
can sometimes depend more on the character of the tax
than on its over all amount. Taxation in the form of
income tax commends itself because it seems to measure
the amount of tax by the ability to pay. On the other
hand, income tax hits directly at business profits which
constitute the incentive and mainspring of economic growth.
Consequently at high rate levels no other tax form can be so
discouraging to business initiative and enterprise. An
inve.;tor or corporate manager can be expected to initiate
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or expand an enterprise only when he foresees attractive
profits. In his calculations he will project ordinary excise
taxes (such as the sales and turn-over taxes so common
in Europe) as fixed items of cost similar to wages and
rents. Prospective revenues in excess of such costs will
represent the profits which his imagination will balloon
in proportion to his optimism. On the other hand, he
can never outdistance income taxes. They will ever stay
with him to dilute profits and to maintain a constant
deflationary pressure on his hopes. More than half the
benefit of any cost cut he may effect through ingenuity,
efficiency or new investment will be lost to him through
a corresponding increase in income taxes. One must be
twice as optimistic to venture capital in the face of a
fifty-tvo per cent income tax rate as without such tax.
Professor Dan Throop Smith once wrote:
The nature of a country's tax structure may be of con-
siderably more importance than the aggregate level of the tax
burden. I am sure that with a reasonable amount of ingenuity
we could devise a tax system which would throttle economic
growth and development though it took only 10 per cent of a
country's national income. I am also sure that, with reasonable
ingenuity, we could devise a tax structure which would go ap-
preciably beyond the oft-mentioned figure of 25 per cent of
national income without being significantly repressive or inflationary.
A destructive tax system would, of course, place especially
high burdens on the gains from risk investments, with light taxes
on relatively riskless uses of capital. . . . It would also have
high marginal rates on incomes.20
Certainly no one could suspect that our tax system
has been deliberately structured to throttle economic growth.
It has tended to grow like Topsy, pulled and pruned one
way or another by political forces which may be ascendant
at one time or another. By and large such forces have
not been impressed by the importance of encouraging profits,
particularly the profits of big business. For thirty years
in this country there have been too many bureaucrats, writers
20 Smith, Introduction to TAX INSTITUTE, THE LiMITS OF TAXABLE
CAPACITY 3-4 (1952).
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and teachers of influence who purport to downgrade the
profit motive as something rather vulgar and selfish-
a curious attitude due, perhaps, in some part to snobbery,
in part to a psychological lack of empathy on the part
of men in professions motivated in greater degree by
satisfactions other than financial gain, and in part by pure
envy. It is the same spirit which frequently finds ex-
pression in terms of Fabian Socialism or state capitalism.
We suspect that it has contributed considerably to the
imbalance of our tax structure in its pressure on private
business and enterprise.
High income taxes might not hinder investment and
industrial growth if only American businesses were involved
and all competitors bore the same burden-for in that case
profits might still be protected by the simple means of
adjusting prices upward to offset the taxes as elements
of cost. This protection of profit margins would also make
it easier to finance capital expansion even in the face of
illiberal depreciation deductions. This was the situation
for many years after World War II while foreign industry
was still in the process of rehabilitation. Now, however,
European and Japanese industries are back on stream
and competing strongly with American industry, both in
foreign markets and here at home. They have the com-
petitive advantage of more liberal income tax and de-
preciation policies of their governments which makes it
more difficult for our industry to protect its profit by
shifting the excessive burden to the ultimate consumer
in the form of increased prices. Yet we must face the fact
that men generally will invest only when they can hope
for reasonable compensation for the use and risk of their
money. All the appeals in the world to socialist theory
or human benevolence will not alter this mainspring of
human conduct. As someone succinctly expressed it: great
profits, great growth-small profits, small growth-no
profits. no growth.
It is unfortunate that any lightening of the tax burden
on business is apt to be criticized by the demogogue and
mistaken by the ignorant as a gratuitous handout to the
rich and "the vested interests." This has probably caused
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many a Congressman and many a government official to
steer his course by short range political considerations
rather than the long range economic welfare of the country.
In this context, too, the economic welfare of the country
is in accord with the general welfare or the common good.
We wish this could be more fully realized in the coming
struggle for thoroughgoing reform of our tax structure.'
21 It is beyond the limited scope of this paper to discuss at length the
question of government deficits which might be increased by any reduction
of the tax burden on business profits. We might suggest, however, the
following lines of argument: (a) Government deficits caused by tax
reductions designed to induce and enable business to grow and improve itself
represent better economic policy than do deficits created by government's
increased spending for doles and nonproductive purposes.
(b) The best way to solve the problem of government deficits is not
by clinging to an uneconomic tax structure but rather by beginning to
phase out our fantastic six billion dollar farm program or by trying to cut
down the waste on dubious projects in our foreign aid program.
(c) Moreover the economy, if stimulated by tax reform as expected,
would eventually provide a broader tax base and hence, over the long run,
lower tax rates might not reduce total tax collections as much as some
people fear.
SCHEDULE A
COMPARISON OF NATIONAL TAX SYSTEMS OF VARIOUS
COUNTRIES AS THEY BEAR ON CORPORATE
PROFITS AND DIVIDENDS
Tax Credit Maximum Marginal
Normal Corporate Allowed Share- Tax Rate on
Tax Rate holders on Dividends Individuals
United States 52.0% 4% 91.0%
Canada 47.0% 20% 80.0%
Netherlands 1 43.0% Note I 72.5%
Luxemburg 40.0% Note 54.0%
Sweden 2 40.0% 2 0 65.0%
Australia 37.5% 0 66.67%
Norway 34.0% 0 55.0%
NoTEs :-
1Both the Netherlands and Luxemburg also withhold and pay an
additional 15 per cent tax on dividends declared and paid to share-
holders and the shareholders in turn receive a credit against their
own taxes for the tax so withheld and paid for their account.
2 Sweden permits the deduction from taxable income of an amount equal
to 40 per cent of business income for reserves to stabilize economic
activity. Forty per cent of these reserves must be invested with the
central bank for use as permitted, depending on the level of economic
activity and employment. The corporation may use the balance of the
reserves as it sees fit.
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Other countries with more complicated differentials are dealt with separately
below:
West Germany:
Undistributed Corporate
Income Normal Tax
Rate
51%
Distributed Corporate
Income Corporate Tax
Rate
15%
Maximum Marginal
Tax Rate on
Individuals
53%
The sensational reduction in tax rate on the portion of corporate income
which is distributed to shareholders eliminates most of the double taxation
on dividends. A corporation also withholds and pays to the State a 25 per
cent tax on dividends declared and paid to shareholders and the shareholders
in turn receive a tax credit for the tax so withheld and paid for their
account.
France:
Undistributed Corporate
Income Tax Rate
Corporation Tax 50%
Temporary Com-
plementary Tax
(renewed 1962) 6%1
Progressive Indi-
vidual Income
Tax
Distributed Corporate
Income Corporate or
Withholding Rates
50%
Tax Rates on
Individual Shareholders
Note I
18%2
(withheld for account of
shareholders)
65%
(maximum marginal rate
offset in part by the
tax withheld) 2
1 The complementary tax is supposed to be a temporary tax but was
renewed in 1962 at the rate of 6 per cent (reduced from 8 per cent).
Individuals are normally subject to this tax on income derived from
business but are exempt therefrom on dividends paid from income on
which the corporation has already paid the tax. The amount of
complementary tax is itself deductible from income in the year in
which it is paid.
2 Normally the withholding tax is 24 per cent but it is reduced by the
amount of complementary tax paid by the corporation.
United Kingdom:
Undistributed Corporate
Income Tax Rate
Standard Income
Tax 38.75%
Distributed Corporate
Income Corporate Tax
Rate
38.75%
(withheld for account of
shareholders)
No tax on corporation
as such
Tax Rates on Individual
Shareholders
38.75%
(completely offset as
to dividends by credit
f o r t h e withholding
tax)
Profits Tax 15%N
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Progressive Surtax
on individual in-
comes over
$5600. 50%
Maximum Marginal
Rate
A shareholder must include in his statement of income the full pre-tax
amount of a dividend, including the amount of standard income tax withheld
thereon for his account. The standard tax when paid, however, is itself
deductible in computing taxable income for the period in which payment is
made. Thus, over a period of years of fairly constant income this would
reduce the average effective standard income tax rate from 38.75 per cent
to approximately 28 per cent (viz., 28 equals 38.75 per cent of (100-28)).
Belgium:
Undistributed Corporate
Income Maxinum
Tax Rate
Professional Tax
on Industrial &
Business
Profits 1 40%
National Crisis
Tax 0
Withholding
Tax 0
Dividend Tax ........
Personal Progres-
sive Complement-
ary Tax ........
Distributed Corporate
Income Corporate
Tax Rate
0
Tax Rate on Individual
Shareholders
0
(as to dividends)
0
(as to dividends)
30%
(for account of
shareholders)
30%
(completely offset by
credit for withholding
tax)
30%
Maximum Marginal
Rate
1 Income Tax rates in Belgium vary in accordance with the source of
income. Rates here given relate only to that class of income char-
acterized as industrial and business profits. We do not include an
additional 2 per cent Temporary Exceptional Tax which in 1961 was
imposed on corporate income (whether or not distributed) but is due
to expire at the end of 1962.
There are two notable peculiarities of the Belgium system: (a) the
professional tax is itself deductible in computing taxable income for the
period in which payment is made. Thus, as we saw in computing taxable
income in the United Kingdom, this serves to reduce the average effective
professional tax rate over a period of years from 40 per cent to approx-
imately 28.5 per cent (viz., 28.5 equals 40 per cent of (100-28.5)). (b) Also
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the effective combined rate of the national crisis tax and withholding tax,
measured against the amount of corporate profits required to generate a
dividend, is not 50 per cent but approximately 45.3 per cent. For example,
if a corporation declared a gross dividend of 100 it would distribute 70 to
the shareholders, would withhold a tax of 30 and would pay an additional
National Crisis Tax of 20. The National Crisis Tax, being paid out of
undistributed profits, would itself be subject to the 40 per cent professional
tax amounting to 8. Thus, out of pre-tax corporate income of about 128,
a corporation could distribute a net dividend of 70 and pay taxes of about
58. The ratio of 58 to 128 approximates 45.3 per cent. The dividend
of 70 so distributed would be received by the shareholder tax-free except
for the Progressive Complementary Tax.
Italy:
Corporate Income Normal Tax Maximum Marginal Tax Rates
Rates on Individual Shareholders
Standard Tax 20% 0 (as to dividends)
Excess Profits Tax 15%1
Complementary Progressive
Tax ........ 50% (The maximum rate is
reached only on the
amount of individual in-
come over $806,000.)
1The corporation excess profits tax is imposed on that amount of
corporate income, after deduction of the standard tax, which exceeds
6 per cent of capital and surplus of the corporation.
One might also note that the Italian Standard Tax and also the Belgian
Pr.essional Tax are the same for corporate and for individual taxpayers,
and are imposed at fixed rates depending upon the particular type of income.
Shareholders are exempt from such taxes on dividends distributed by
corporations which have paid such taxes on the income distributed. In
European nomenclature these taxes are referred to as "objective" taxes
since their rates depend on the classification of the object (the income)
taxed rather than the subject (the taxpayer) taxed. In the above schedule
for both of said countries we have assumed the corporate income was
derived from ordinary commercial activities not including revenue from real
estate, bonds or stocks.
Data for this Schedule has been compiled from various sources including:
Foreign Tax Service of Foreign Tax Law Association, Inc.; "The Belgian
System of Taxation," Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy, (December
1961) particularly Part II's comparative study of direct taxes in various
countries; Michigan Legal Studies on the European Common Market
(1960) v. 2, pp. 349-420; and miscellaneous documents.
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SCHEDULE B
DEPRECIATION POLICIES OF CERTAIN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
United Kingdom:
Basic depreciation rates, developed in consultation with various trade
associations, have been set at 72 per cent, 10 per cent, 122 per cent and
20 per cent for various categories of industrial machinery and equipment.
Applied on a declining-balance basis, they are increased by one-fourth to
effective rates of 9ys per cent, 122 per cent, 15ys per cent and 25 per cent
of the declining balance. Individual taxpayers may be able to justify higher
rates.
The most liberal features of the British depreciation policies, however,
are the so-called Initial Allowance and Investment Allowance which are
allowed for the first year of an asset's life in addition to the normal annual
deduction described in the first paragraph above. The Initial Allowance
is an extra amount of depreciation charged against the cost of the asset
like other depreciation deductions so that the total depreciation allowed
during the lifetime of the asset is not increased. However, the Investment
Allowance is an extraordinary deduction allowed as an incentive bonus for
investment in useful forms of industry. It is not charged against the
cost of the asset. The rates therefor are as follows:
Indtustriac Machinery Mines, Oil Scientific
Buildings & Plant Wells, etc. Research
Initial Allowance 5% 10% 20% 60%
Investment Allowance 10% 20% 20% 20%
France:
France appears to be liberal in its estimate of the "useful life of an
asset" over which it permits depreciation deductions to be spread on a
straight-line basis. Thus ordinary machinery is given a regular straight-
line depreciation rate of 15 per cent based on a useful life of 6-2/3 years
and heavy machinery (such as steel mill equipment) one of 10 per cent
based on a useful life of ten years. A double deduction, however, is allowed
the first year on an asset whose useful life exceeds five years. On top of
this an additional initial depreciation allowance of 10 per cent is permitted
on equpment purchased as part of a modernization program. Under this
system a machine with a regular straight-line depreciation rate of 15 per cent
would get 37 per cent of cost written off the first year (10 per cent initial
allowance plus double the 13.5 per cent allowed on the balance of cost spread
over 6-2/3 years) and approximately 11.19 per cent in each of the succeeding
5-2/3 years.
As an alternative to taking advantage of the double deduction and the
initial allowance outlined above, France permits accelerated depreciation on
a declining-balance method, whereby straight-line rates may be increased 1Y
times for property with a life of three or four years, doubled for a life of
five or six years, and raised by 2Y times for lives of more than six years.
Under this alternative method the machine described above would be
depreciated for the first three years at the respective rates of 37.5 per cent,
approximately 23.4 per cent, and approximately 14.63 per cent, or an aggregate
of 75.57 per cent compared with 59.39 per cent under the first method.
Also, under certain conditions, France permits the revaluation of property
to compensate for past inflations in establishing a basis for depreciation.
This provision may be of decreasin-g importance in the future if France
succeeds in maintaining the fiscal stability established under General
DeGaulle.
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West Germany:
The German rule is to permit straight-line- depreciation deductions on
property over its normal useful life to the firm owning it, taking into
account potential obsolescence. Thus the actual rate and life period are
matters of individual negotiation for each business. A basic depreciation
rate of 10 per cent is said to be common for straight-line depreciation of
machinery. Under a declining-balance method this may be increased 2%4
times provided that it may not exceed an annual rate of 25 per cent.
Depreciation rates may be increased by private negotiation in case of double
or triple-shift operation. Accelerated depreciation deductions are permitted
in certain instances, e.g., in "basic industries" such as coal, iron, mining,
steel and hydro-electric, taxpayers are permitted to write off 50 per cent
of the cost of movable assets, and 30 per cent of the cost of fixed assets in
the first five years of their life, in addition to their regular straight-line
deductions.
Belgium:
Depreciation rates on a straight-line basis are subject to negotiation in
individual cases with a view to spreading the deductions over the useful
life of the depreciable property but with a margin of safety to cover
accidental loss and potential obsolescence. The following rates have been
customary on new assets: Industrial buildings and offices-3 to 5 per cent;
specialized buildings (e.g., chemical or brewing)-10 to 15 per cent; explosives
factories-10 to 30 per cent; fixed plant-10 to 12 per cent or more;
movable plant-20 to 25 per cent; loose tools-33 to 100 per cent.
A declining-balance method is permitted but is said to be little used.
Also in some instances accelerated depreciation of 33-1/3 per cent annually
has been allowed by reason of "a particular economic situation."
A temporary law which has been extended through 1963 permits the
deduction from taxable business income of 30 per cent of the profits which
are invested in new industrial plants, land or other assets or in the sub-
stantial expansion of existing industrial plant. This deduction must be
spread over three years at the annual rate of 10 per cent. If profits in any
year are insufficient to absorb the permitted deduction it may be carried
forward for five years.
Netherlands:
Straight-line depreciation is permitted in accordance with good com-
mercial practice. The conventional rate on machinery is said to be 10 per cent
and on buildings 1Y2 to 3 per cent. An additional initial deduction for
depreciation is allowed in the first year amounting to 6 per cent on office
equipment, motor cars and buildings other than factory buildings, and up
to a maximum of 8-1/3 per cent on other assets.
The Netherlands also grants an investment allowance aggregating 20
per cent of cost of industrial capital assets, deductible from income at the
rate of 4 per cent per year for the first five years after investment. This
investment allowance is not chargeable against the depreciation basis of
the property involved.
Italy:
Straight-line depreciation is permitted over the estimated useful life
of depreciable property. In practice the tax authorities set straight-line
rates varying from 3 per cent to 20 per cent per year. Italy permits
accelerated depreciation by a unique formula which shortens the depreciation
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life by 40 per cent and then permits the depreciation quota normally allotted
to the end period so eliminated, to be added to the normal depreciation
deductions for the first four years. Thus a machine with a given ten-year
life could be depreciated over six years at the following annual rates:
20, 20, 20, 20, 10 and 10 per cents.
Lu.emburg:
Luxemburg permits depreciation on the basis of historical cost to the
taxpayer, with some adjustment for inflationary appreciation of values, over
the estimated useful life of the depreciable property. It takes a liberal
view of the work life of property with generous regard for potential
obsolescence. Its tax budgets have customarily permitted an initial investment
allowance to be deducted from taxable income, equal to 20 per cent of the
cost of new investments in certain kinds of property subject to maximum
limitations, e.g., the 1960 budget limited such deduction to twenty-four
million francs (about $483,000) for any year.
Sweden:
Today Sweden permits depreciation deductions against all depreciable
assets (other than buildings) at an annual rate of 20 per cent of historical
cost, thus compatible with an assumed five-year useful life. In the alternative
it permits an accelerated 30 per cent depreciation rate on the declining-balance
of the depreciable assets, subject to adjustment for any gains realized on a
sale of depreciable assets. In any year when the latter method does not
yield the taxpayer as favorable a position as the first, the taxpayer may
elect to take depreciation by reducing his book value of depreciable assets
to cost less straight-line depreciation at the annual rate of 20 per cent.
As to buildings, Sweden permits straight-line depreciation on the basis
of estimated useful lives more in accord with custom and tax practice
elsewhere.
Reference here should also be made to Schedule A regarding the
extraordinary 40 per cent deduction which Sweden permits corporations to
take against income for reserves to stabilize economic activity.
Data for this Schedule has been compiled frmn various sources including:
Foreign Tax Service of Foreign Tax Law Association, Inc.; Monthly Letter,
First National City Bank, September 1960; Ch. II, "Incnne Tax Differ-
entials," Tax Institute (1958), and miscellaneous documents.
